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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since this case began, Marti E. Mortensen and Vernon J. Mortensen have divorced and 
are no longer represented by the same counsel; on appeal, they will be referred to as M.E. 
Mortensen and V.l. Mortensen for the sake of clarity. On appeal, M.E. Mortensen claims that 
the trial court erred in fixing the width and location of the easement. M.E. Mortensen also 
contends punitive damages are not justified by the facts of the case. M.E. Mortensen also 
contends if punitive damages are justified by the facts, the amount awarded is excessive. M.E. 
Mortensen also contends if any amount of punitive damages is justifiable, she is not responsible 
for such damages and her share of community property should not be subjected to execution to 
pay such damages. M.E. Mortensen contends that the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees. 
Finally, M.E. Mortensen contends that the trial court judge should have recused himself on 
remand. 
H. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
The nature of this case and the facts of this case have been set out at length in Akers v. 
D.L. White Constr., Inc., 142 Idaho 293, 127 P.3d 196 (2005) (Akers 1), Akers v. Mortensen, 147 
Idaho 39, 205 P.3d 1175 (2009) (Akers 11) and a related case, Mortensen v. Stewart Title Guar .Co., 
149 Idaho 437, 235 P.3d 387 (2010). In Akers 1, this Court affirmed that the disputed triangle area 
located on the east end of the access road belonged to Akers. This Court noted on appeal that 
neither party contested the course, direction and width of the express easement as determined by the 
district court across Akers' property in Government Lot 2. In Akers II, this Court affirmed the trial 
court's finding that there was no implied easement across Akers' property in Government Lot 2 or 
across Parcel B. Akers II, 147 Idaho 39, 205 P.2d at 1182 (2009). This Court affirmed the district 
court's finding that Mortensen had a prescriptive easement across the Akers' property in Government 
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Lot 2 coextensive in scope with the express easement declared by the district court. Akers II, 147 
Idaho at 47, 205 P.2d at 1183. This Court affirmed the trial court's finding that a prescriptive 
easement 12.2 feet wide permits Mortensen to reach his property over the access road, but 
remanded for further fact finding on the exact location of the easement and for a redetermination 
of damages. Akers II, 147 Idaho at 44,48,205 P.3d at 1180, 1184. 
In the first appeal, this Court noted that Mortensen argued that ownership of the triangular 
parcel was especially significant because much of the Akers' claimed trespass damages took 
place in the disputed triangle. In the first appeal, Mortensen acknowledged to this Court if Akers 
owned the triangle parcel that they would be liable for trespasses in that area. Akers I, 142 Idaho 
293 at 299, 127 P.3d 196 at 202 (2005). 
B. Course of Proceedings 
In Akers II, this Court remanded this case to the district court for further fact finding on 
the exact location of the easement and for a redetermination of damages. Akers II, 147 Idaho at 
44,48,205 P.3d at 1180, 1184. Following filing of this Court's substituted decision on appeal 
and remittitur, the trial court received a surfeit of pleadings. 
On May 4,2009, V.l. Mortensen filed a motion for disqualification of the district judge 
for cause and a supporting memorandum. R Vol. I, pp. 43-49. No notice of hearing was filed. 
On May 6, 2009, the trial court noticed the motion for hearing for May 21, 2009. R Vol. I, p. 84. 
Akers' response to the motion was filed May 15,2009. R Vol. I, pp. 50-66. V.l. Mortensen 
moved to strike this opposition response on May 19,2009, claiming among other things that it 
was untimely. R Vol. I, pp. 67-69. An affidavit and memorandum in response to the motion to 
strike were filed by Akers on May 20,2009. R Vol. I, pp. 70-81. On May 29, 2009, the district 
court entered an order denying V.l. Mortensen's motion to strike Plaintiffs' pleadings, finding 
that V.l. Mortensen had not articulated any prejudice. R Vol. I, pp. 82-83. White joined in the 
2 
motion to disqualify at oral argument. On June 1,2009, the trial court entered an Order denying 
the motion to disqualify for cause. R Vol. I, pp. 84-90. On June 19,2009, V.l. Mortensen filed 
a motion for reconsideration of the trial court's denial of his motion to disqualify for cause. R 
Vol. I, pp. 91-94. On June 30, 2009, the trial court issued its memorandum decision again 
denying the motion. R Vol. I, pp. 113-129. 
In the interim, V.l. Mortensen filed a motion for partial release of the bond to pay his 
outstanding attorney fees. V.J. Mortensen argued that the attorney fees were a charging lien 
against the cash bond. Both Akers and M.E. Mortensen objected to the release of the funds to 
V.J. Mortensen, and V.l. Mortensen replied to those objections. R Vol. I, pp. 95-113. On July 8, 
2009, the district court denied V.J. Mortensen's motion for partial release ofthe cash bond to 
satisfy his attorney's fee lien, holding that an attorney charging lien does not attach to an 
appellate cash bond. R Vol. I, pp. 121-129. On January 8,2010, the district court granted M.E. 
Mortensen's motion to transfer or release the cash bond, releasing the bond proceeds to M.E. 
MOliensen as the posting p31iy, and requiring the funds be interplead in Boundary Case No. CV 
2206-224 (the Mortensen divorce case). R Vol. I, pp. 156-163. 
On July 8, 2009, the trial court entered an order granting leave for V.J. Mortensen's 
attorney to withdraw as attorney of record for V.l. Mortensen. R Vol. I, p. 130-132. On July 24, 
2009, V.l. Mortensen thereafter appeared pro se. R Vol. I, p. 133-135. 
On October 8,2009, the trial court entered an order for mediation and an order regarding 
burdens of proof on remand on the issues remaining to be determined on remand. R Vol. I, pp. 
136-138. 
On October 22, 2009, Defendants filed a memorandum regarding the burden of proof on 
the easement location. R Vol. I, pp. 139-152. V.J. Mortensen does not include Akers' burden of 
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proof brief in the appellate record, although one was filed October 20, 2009. R. Vol. 1, p. 21. 
On December 1, 2009, the trial court entered its Order regarding the burdens of proof on the 
issues to be determined on remand and established a briefing schedule on the issue of the 
location of the prescriptive easement in Parcel B. Each party was ordered to submit a brief 
regarding location of the easement containing references to specific trial exhibits and citation to 
authority to support their arguments regarding the location of the easement as established at trial. 
R Vol. I, pp. 153-155. On January 2,2010, the district court entered an order extending 
Defendants' briefing schedule regarding the easement location by one week, and adjusting 
Plaintiffs briefing schedule accordingly. R Vol. I, pp. 164-166. On January 22,2010, V.J. 
Mortensen filed the Brief ofVemon 1. Mortensen Supporting Location of Easement. R Vol. I, 
pp. 167-172. On March 29,2010, the Brief of Defendants White RE: Section 24 Easement 
Location was filed. R Vol. I, pp. 173-205. On June 17,2010, Akers filed Plaintiffs' Brief on 
Second Remand Regarding Location of Easement. R Vol. II, pp. 233-339. White filed a reply 
brief regarding the easement location on June 24, 2010. R Vol. II, pp. 340-357. 
On March 30, 2010, M.E. Mortensen filed the Affidavit of Marti Mortensen and Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment. R Vol. I, pp. 206-216. On April 14, 2010, Akers filed a 
Memorandum in Support of the Motion to Strike the affidavit and motion for partial summary 
judgment. R Vol. I, pp. 217-221. M.E. Mortensen responded to the Motion to Strike on April 
27,2010. R Vol. I, p. 222-225. On May 3, 2010, the trial court issued its memorandum decision 
and order granting Plaintiffs motion to strike. R Vol. I, pp. 226-232. The trial court held that 
the motion was premature as it had not yet ruled on the easement location or damages on 
remand. The trial court held that M. Mortensen could renew her motion for summary judgment 
or other dispositive motion regarding punitive damages ifthey were awarded following 
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detennination on remand of the location of the easement across Parcel B. R Vol. I, p 231. In 
approaching the motion in this manner, the trial court noted it was preserving to M.E. Mortensen 
an opportunity to defend against punitive damages from a factual standpoint in the first instance, 
and if awarded, from a legal standpoint. R Vol. I, p. 232. 
On June 30, 2010, White filed a Motion to Admit Additional Evidence RE: Easement 
Location. R Vol. II, pp. 358-367. (White also filed the Affidavit of Michael Hathaway in 
support of the motion which was not included in the appellate record.) 
On July 1, 2010, the trial court heard argument regarding the easement location. R. Vol. 
I, p. 23. On September 29,2010, the district court filed its Memorandum Decision, Findings of 
Fact, Conclusion of Law and Order RE: Easement Location. R Vol. II, pp. 368-388. 
On November 10, 2010, Akers filed their Memorandum on Second Remand Re: 
Damages. R Vol. II, pp. 389-396. M.E. Mortensen filed her response brief regarding damages 
on November 17,2010. R Vol. II, pp. 397-404. On November 19,2010, Akers filed a brief in 
reply to M. Mortensen's response. R. Vol. II, pp. 419-431. On the same date, Akers filed an 
Amended Notice of Hearing on Remand Re: Damages scheduling oral argument for January 26, 
2011. R Vol. I, p. 23, R Vol. III, p. 511. White filed a responsive brief on damages designated 
as a "reply brief" on January 18,2012. R Vol. II, pp. 407-414. Akers filed a reply to White's 
response brief on January 25,2011. R Vol. III, pp. 469-476. 
On January 19,2011, White filed a Supplemental Affidavit of Mike Hathaway. R. Vol. 
II, pp. 415-418. White filed another Supplemental Affidavit of Mike Hathaway on January 25, 
2011. R Vol. III, pp. 477-481. On the same date, White filed a notice of hearing on a Motion to 
Admit Additional Evidence RE: Easement location for January 26,2011 and a Motion to Shorten 
Time. R Vol. III, p. 512. 
5 
On January 24,2011, V.l Mortensen filed a "Motion to Correct Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order Filed 1-2-3 and Memorandum Decision and Order on 
Reconsideration, On New Trial Issues, and Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
Regarding Damages and Order filed 4-01-04" and an Affidavit in Support of the motion. R Vol. 
II, pp. 432-468. Akers filed a Response to the motion on February 11,2011. R Vol. III, pp. 482-
498. Y.l Mortensen filed his reply brief on February 18,2011. R Vol. III, pp. 499-504. 
At the January 26, 2011 hearing, the district court heard arguments regarding damages, 
and argument on Defendants' request to reopen the matter for the presentation of new evidence. 
Plaintiff was given an opportunity to file a post-hearing brief on the motion to reopen the 
evidence given the shortened time frame for hearing. R Vol. III, p. 512. A post-hearing 
memorandum was filed by Akers on February 16,2011. R Vol. III, pp. 495-498. On March 18, 
2011, the trial court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order on Remand re: Damages and 
Order denying White's motion for leave to submit additional evidence on the easement location. 
R Vol. III, pp. 505-544. V.J. Mortensen requested reconsideration of this decision on April 5, 
2011. R Vol. III, pp. 545-569. 
Although no notice of hearing had been filed, at oral argument on January 26, 2011, V.J. 
Mortensen requested that his motion to correct be heard. The district court declined hearing V.J. 
Mortensen's motion to correct on January 26,2011 because neither Plaintiffs counsel nor the 
court had yet had an opportunity to review V.J. Mortensen's pleadings. R Vol. III pp. 512-513. 
On February 11,2011, Akers filed a response to V.J. Mortensen's motion to correct. Akers 
agreed there was one mistake that needed corrected in the findings and opposed the remainder of 
V.J. Mortensen's request. R Vol. III, pp. 482-495. V.J. Mortensen filed a reply to Akers' 
response on February 18,2011. R Vol. III, pp. 499-504. Oral argument was held on March 22, 
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2011. R Vol. III, p 572. On May 23,2011, the trial court issued its memorandum decision 
denying V.l Mortensen's motion to correct. R Vol. III, pp. 570-605. 
On August 10,2011, the trial court entered its Fourth Amended Judgment and Decree on 
Second Remand. R Vol. III, pp. 606-609. On August 24,2011, White filed a motion to 
reconsider. R Vol. III, pp, 610-611. 
On August 24,2011, Akers filed a supplemental memorandum of costs incurred through 
August 24,2011 and supporting affidavit. R Vol. III, pp. 612-628. White filed an objection and 
motion to disallow attorney fees on September 7,2011. R Vol. III, pp. 629-632. White filed a 
Memorandum in Support of Objection to Claim for Attorney Fees on October 25,2011. R Vol. 
III, pp. 661-668. On November 2,2011, Akers filed a response to White's motion to disallow 
attorney fees. R Vol. III, pp. 669-679.0n November 16,2011, the trial court issued its decision 
and order denying Whites' motion to reconsider and granting Akers' claims for attorney fees. R 
Vol. III, pp. 682-701. M.E. Mortensen filed no objection to attorney fees. 
M.E. Mortensen filed a Notice of Appeal on September 8, 2011. R Vol. III, pp. 633-641. 
V.J. Mortensen filed a Notice of Appeal on September 21,2011. R Vol. III, pp. 642-651. M.E. 
Mortensen filed an amended Notice of Appeal on September 30,2011. R Vol. III, pp. 652-660. 
On November 7,2011, this Court filed its Order consolidating appeal No. 39182 (M.E. 
Mortensen) and 39293 (V.J. Mortensen) into appeal No. 39182, and requiring all documents to 
bear both docket numbers. R Vol. III, pp. 680-681. On December 13, 2011, White filed their 
notice of appeal. R Vol. III, pp. 702-707. 
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C. Statement of Facts 
M.E. Mortensen referenced this Court's withdrawn slip opinion 2008 Opinion No. 68 for 
her statement of facts. Given subsequent argument in M.E. Mortensen's brief, it appears M.E. 
Mortensen takes this approach because it is her position that the prescriptive easement road 
extended at least one hundred twenty-five (125) feet into Akers property. Akers disagrees with 
this statement of the facts. Defendants claimed at trial that the western end of the road had not 
been substantially altered through the years by either them or their predecessors other than 
excavation done solely on White's property by White and V.J. Mortensen. Plaintiffs'trial 
Exhibit 6, which was a survey of the road as it existed, showed the access road eased south as it 
passed over Parcel B. Only a small portion ofthe road actually passed over Parcel B. The 
majority of the road resides on White's property and the "shepard's crook" pathway referenced 
by M.E. Mortensen in page 5 of her opening brief lies solely on White's property after the road 
eases south. 
III. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Akers do not request attorney fees on appeal. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review 
In Akers II, 147 Idaho at 1180-1181,205 P.3d 43-44, this Court set forth its standard of 
review on appeal as follows: 
Review of a trial court's decision is limited to ascertaining whether the 
evidence supports the findings of fact, and whether the findings of fact support the 
conclusions of law. Benninger v. Derifield, 142 Idaho 486, 489, 129 P.3d 1235, 
1238 (2006) (citing Alumet v. Bear Lake Grazing Co., 119 Idaho 946, 949, 812 
P.2d 253, 256 (1991». Since it is the province of the trial court to weigh 
conflicting evidence and testimony and to judge the credibility of the witnesses, 
this Court will liberally construe the trial court's findings of fact in favor of the 
judgment entered. Rowley v. Fuhrman, 133 Idaho 105, 107, 982 P.2d 940, 942 
8 
(1999) (citing Sun Valley Shamrock Res., Inc. v. Travelers Leasing Corp., 118 
Idaho 116, 118,794 P.2d 1389, 1391 (1990». A trial court's findings of fact will 
not be set aside on appeal unless the findings are clearly erroneous. Ransom v. 
Topaz Mktg., L.P., 143 Idaho 641, 643, 152 P.3d 2, 4 (2006) (citing Camp v. East 
Fork Ditch Co., Ltd., 137 Idaho 850, 856,55 P.3d 304,310 (2002); Bramwell v. 
South Rigby Canal Co., 136 Idaho 648, 650, 39 P.3d 588, 590 (2001); LR.C.P 
52(a». If the findings of fact are based upon substantial evidence, even if the 
evidence is conflicting, they will not be overturned on appeal. Benninger, 142 
Idaho at 489, 129 P.3d at 1238 (citing Hunter v. Shields, 131 Idaho 148, 151, 953 
P.2d 588, 591 (1998». This Court will not substitute its view of the facts for that 
of the trial court. Ransom, 143 Idaho at 643, 152 P.3d at 4 (citing Bramwell, 136 
Idaho at 648, 39 P.3d at 588). The findings of the trial court on the question of 
damages will not be set aside when based upon substantial and competent 
evidence. Trilogy Network Sys., Inc. v. Johnson, 144 Idaho 844, 846, 172 P.3d 
1119, 1121 (2007) (citing Idaho Falls Bonded Produce Supply Co. v. General 
Mills Rest. Group, Inc., 105 Idaho 46, 49, 665 P.2d 1056, 1059 (1983». 
B. Marti Mortensen Provided No argument or Case Authority 
Regarding the Location of the Easement 
M.E. Mortensen adopts in her opening brief as her argument on this issue the arguments 
presented by Appellants White and V.l. Mortensen and incorporates them into her brief. V.l. 
Mortensen's brief on appeal is a rambling discourse of disjointed thoughts and argument. Akers 
submit that even reading V.l. Mortensen's pleadings liberally, V.l. Mortensen advanced no 
argument regarding the easement location in Parcel B. Further, V.l. Mortensen provided no 
authority to suppOli any argument regarding the location of the easement. This Court has 
consistently held it will not consider assignments of error not supported by argument and 
authority in the opening brief. Jorgensen v. Coppedge, 145 Idaho 524, 181 P.3d 450 (2008). 
Because V.l. Mortensen's brief suffers from this fatal deficiency, M.E. Mortensen's brief does so 
as well. 
Regarding the width ofthe easement, V.l. Mortensen did provide some argument that the 
trial court was incorrect in utilizing the 12.2 foot width. However, this Court affirmed the 12.2 
foot width in Akers II, and the width of the easement was not an issue for remand. Thus, the trial 
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court did not err in refusing to reconsider the issue of width on remand as it was not within the 
scope ofthe remand. 
As to the adoption of the arguments of White, as of the preparation of this responsive 
brief, Akers has received no appellate brief from White, despite such brief being due June 4, 
2012. On July 14,2012, this Court issued an order of conditional dismissal of White's appeal, 
requiring their brief to be filed July 30, 2012. Since Akers has no brief from White as ofthe time 
of the preparation this brief, if such a brief is filed by White before the conditional dismissal 
becomes effective, Akers adopts herein their response to White's brief. 
C. The Trial Court did not Err in Awarding Punitive Damages against V.J. 
Mortensen 
1. There was a Basis for the Award of Punitive Damages 
Idaho Code § 6-1604(1) provides "[i]n any action seeking recovery of punitive damages, 
the claimant must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, oppressive, fraudulent, malicious or 
outrageous conduct by the party against whom the claim for punitive damages is asserted." 
Idaho case law requires the same. An award of punitive damages will be sustained on appeal 
only when it is shown that the defendant acted in a manner that was "an extreme deviation from 
reasonable standards of conduct, and that the act was performed by the defendant with an 
understanding of or disregard for its likely consequences." Cheney v. Palos Verdes Inv. Corp., 
104 Idaho 897,905,665 P.2d 661,669 (1983) (citations omitted). The justification of punitive 
damages must be that the defendant acted with an extremely harmful state of mind, whether that 
be termed "malice, oppression, fraud or gross negligence;" "malice, oppression, wantonness;" or 
simply "deliberate or willful." Id. The primary purpose behind an award of punitive damages is 
to deter similar conduct from happening in the future. Walston v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 129 
Idaho 211, 221, 923 P.2d 456,465 (1996). 
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M.E. Mortensen contends on appeal there was no basis for the award of punitive 
damages. She arrives at this conclusion based upon her contention that there can never exist in 
an easement case facts sufficient to award punitive damages where the width of the easement has 
not been defined. The trial court relied upon R. T Nahas Co. v. Hulet, 114 Idaho 23, 752 P.2d 
625 (Ct. App. 1988) in rejecting this argument. The trial court found significance in the portions 
of the decision emphasized below in the COUli of Appeals reasoning. 
In the present case, we believe the record lacks substantial evidence that 
Hulet's actions were an "extreme deviation from reasonable standards of conduct" 
or were the product of an "extremely harmful state of mind." Hulet arguably 
relied upon his water permit in diverting the water. Certainly Hulet was 
motivated by monetary gain. However, standing alone this is an insufficient 
basis upon which to find that the criteria for punitive damages have been 
satisfied. Furthermore, the trial court's finding of "oppressiveness" is not 
supported by the record. It is true that Hulet violated the eventually determined 
water right of a neighbor. However, at that time the scope of Nahas' right was 
uncertain; it was not adjudicated until the 1981 trial. All of the acts complained of 
took place before Nahas had his rights adjudicated. Although we do not suggest 
that interference with unadjudicated rights never can satisfy the criteria for 
punitive damages, we hold that the record in this case falls short of showing 
the extreme circumstances required for such an award. Compare Village of 
Peck v. Denison, 92 Idaho 747, 450 P.2d 310 (1969) (punitive damages properly 
awarded against defendants who threatened to disrupt village water supply by 
disconnecting water system, putting debris in springs, threatening to kill persons 
who attempt to repair the system, and threatening to build a feed lot near the 
spring in order to contaminate the water). Accordingly, on remand the judgment 
must be modified to delete the award of punitive damages. (Emphasis added.) 
R. T Nahas Co. v. Hulet, 114 Idaho at 29. 
It was not error for the trial court to rely upon this authority. 
M.E. Mortensen argues on appeal, as she did to the trial court below, that the fact the 
exact location of the easement rights was unknown shows that the requisite mental state of intent 
cannot exist. (M.E. Mortensen Opening Brief at 6.) In advancing this argument, M.E. 
Mortensen does not challenge on appeal any of the findings of fact or conclusions of law made 
by the trial court regarding V.l. Mortensen's or White's actions. 
11 
In a well reasoned and thorough analysis, the trial court explained why it rejected M.E. 
Mortensen's argument. R Vol. III, pp. 517-543. Without repeating word for word the trial 
court's analysis, the trial court considered the unique facts of this case that established 
substantial evidence that the Defendants' actions were an "extreme deviation from reasonable 
standards of conduct" or were the product of an "extremely harmful state of mind. II These facts 
included: (1) Defendants excavated on Akers' land beyond their easement width, (2) the 
excavation was not done to "maintain" the easement as claimed by Defendants, but rather to 
expand and develop the easement to accommodate development of their land, even though the 
prescriptive easement was limited to agricultural use; (3) the work was not done with proper 
permits, resulting in two stop work red tags from Kootenai County for dumping fill dirt and 
excavating without a proper site disturbance permit; (4) the excavation work resulted in water 
trespass on Akers property; (5) Mortensen was aware of the access problem over the Akers' 
property when he purchased his property; (6) Mortensen violated Kootenai County's subdivision 
ordinances on prior occasions and thereby harmed innocent purchasers of property; (7) 
Mortensen approached the neighbor, Bill Reynolds, to purchase an easement on his land to 
address the access issue; (8) the Defendants intentionally ignored the Plaintiffs requests that they 
not trespass on their land; (9) Defendants tried to intimidate Akers to obtain a greater right than 
they had; (9) there were threats of physical violence against Akers, and (10) the Defendants 
violated the terms of the preliminary injunction issued by the trial court. 
The trial court's analysis that the activities in the vicinity ofthis easement exceeded even 
what is allowed on an express easement was correct. Citing to Ransom v. Topaz Marketing, L.P., 
143 Idaho 641, 642, 152 P.3d 2,3 (2006), the trial court noted that even with an express 
easement a party may not push dirt onto other property owned by the burdened estate and make 
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cuts into the burdened estate's property which have nothing to do with creation or maintenance 
of the road itself, and alter the natural flow of water causing sink holes and sloughs. Id 
The trial court also addressed the prescriptive portion of the easement. Citing to 
Beckstead v. Price, 146 Idaho 57, 64-65, 190 P.3d 876,883-884 (2008), the court noted that the 
use of the easement was not defined by the vehicles using it but rather by characterization as 
residential, agricultural or recreational, and the scope allowed should include any reasonable 
means of transportation for the character of use made during the prescription. The trial court 
observed that V.l. Mortensen knew of this limitation on the use ofthe easement because he 
testified that the access issue was the sole reason he was able to buy the property so cheap. 
Similar to land barons of the early west, defendants pushed the boundaries of acceptable 
behavior for the sake of chasing a profit. They ignored county ordinances. They bullied the 
Akers. They lied about their actions, claiming they were innocently "maintaining" the road 
when it was clear they were obliterating a well maintained access road to the detriment of the 
Akers so they could widen it to accommodate their profit goals. 
Their inappropriate actions continued at the court house. They intimidated witnesses 
who came to court to testify on behalf of Akers about Defendants' actions. Although it is hard to 
discern from a cold transcript such happenings, one such event was even recorded at trial during 
Mr. Regan's direct examination ofD.L. White. D.L. White interrupted his own attorney's direct 
examination of him mid-question to make an intimidating comment to Akers, causing Akers' 
attorney to intercede. Tr Vol. I, p. 928, 11. 3-12. The trial court commented in its findings about 
the trial court's own observation oftheir intimidation tactics during trial. If ever a case 
demonstrated an appropriate set of facts as a basis for imposition of punitive damages on an 
easement case, it is this case. This Court should affirm on appeal the trial court's conclusion that 
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the above actions were an extreme deviation from standard conduct and the product of an 
extremely harmful state of mind. 
2. The Trial Court did not Abuse its Discretion in the Amount Awarded 
as Punitive Damages 
M.E. Mortensen also claims in a conclusory statement that the amount awarded was 
excessive and constituted an abuse of discretion by the trial court, yet M.E. Mortensen provides 
no argument detailing why the amount awarded was an abuse of discretion, or excessive other 
than claiming it goes "far beyond deterrence and is merely punishment." The trial court 
expressed in its amended findings offacts and conclusions of law, the amount awarded was done 
for deterrence. The actions taken here were for the sake of profit, and the risks were a weighed 
business decision. V.l. Mortensen had a history of making development choices that harm 
others to maximize his profit. His choices were a matter of expediency because the profit 
outweighed the money damages any person objecting to his tactics could obtain. 
Further, both Defendants in this matter disregarded a preliminary injunction issued by the 
trial and proceeded forward as they chose. Their actions rendered the trial court's order useless. 
Unless deterred, such actions encourage both the Defendants and future owners in land disputes 
to disregard the court system and move forward with similar conduct. 
It is exactly this type of conduct that punitive damages are recognized as deterring. This 
distinction was recognized and called out in Boise Dodge, Inc., v. Clark, 92 Idaho 902, 909, 453 
P.2d 551,558 (1969); wherein this Court recognized that: 
[T]hose who deliberately and coolly engage in a far-flung fraudulent 
scheme, systematically conducted for profit, are very much more likely to pause 
and consider the consequences if they have to pay more than the actual loss 
suffered by an individual plaintiff. An occasional award of compensatory 
damages against such parties would have little deterrent effect. A judgment 
simply for compensatory damages would require the offender to do no more than 
return the money which he had taken from the plaintiff. In the calculation of his 
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expected profits, the wrongdoer is likely to allow for a certain amount of money 
which will have to be returned to those victims who object too vigorously, and he 
will be perfectly content to bear the additional cost of litigation as the price for 
continuing his illicit business. It stands to reason that the chances of deterring him 
are materially increased by subjecting him to the payment of punitive damages. 
M.E. Mortensen provides no substantive argument as to why the amount awarded by the 
trial comi was excessive. The trial court heard testimony regarding the wealth of the 
Defendants, their goals in making a profit, and their history of similar conduct. Its award was 
well supported by these facts. M.E. Mortensen does not contend on appeal that it was an abuse 
of discretion for the trial court to consider these factors in setting the amount of punitive 
damages. Thus, M.E. Mortensen has failed on appeal to make any showing that the trial court 
abused its discretion in the amount it awarded as punitive damages. 
3. Any Issue Regarding M.E. Mortensen Avoiding Imposition of 
Punitive Damages Against Her was Waived on Appeal 
Despite two other appeals having been presented to this Court, for the first time on appeal 
M.E. Mortensen seeks to have this court rule as a matter of first impression that a spouse's 
community property assets are not liable for punitive damages awarded against the spouse. That 
holding would stand regardless of the marital status of the spouse. This issue was not raised in 
the first or second appeal. M.E. Mortensen claims it was not raised because it was not ripe for 
appeal as she was not divorced from V.l Mortensen at that time. However, this issue has 
nothing to do with the status of the marriage, and could have, and should have, been raised on 
the first appeal. 
Further, the issue has not been preserved to be raised in this appeal. M.E. Mortensen in 
her recitation to the course of proceedings below indicates on appeal that the trial court struck 
her motion for summary judgment regarding allocation of punitive damages. She phrases her 
issue on appeal with respect to this issue as: "May Marti Mortensen assert a claim to avoid 
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imposition of punitive damages against her?" M.E. Mortensen is careful not to claim the court 
disallowed the claim or erred by arriving at the wrong legal conclusions. This avoidance is 
because the trial court did not rule on this issue. 
M.E. Mortensen filed a motion for partial summary judgment that she was not 
responsible either personally or as to her share of the community estate for punitive damages 
assessed for actions ofV.J. Mortensen. R Vol. II, p. 210. Akers contended, without addressing 
the merits of the motion, that such a motion was not subsidiary to the remand and should not be 
considered on remand. R Vol. II, p. 217-221. M.E. Mortensen maintained her motion was 
subsidiary to the remand. Further, M.E. Mortensen contended that she could not have raised the 
issue sooner in the case because it was not ripe until after her divorce from V.J. Mortensen in 
2006. R Vol. II, pp. 222-225. The trial court issued a memorandum decision granting Akers 
motion. However, in doing so, the trial court did not reject or otherwise rule on M.E. 
Mortensen's motion. Rather, the trial court recognized that the primary issue on remand was the 
location of the easement in Parcel B. The trial court acknowledged that subsidiary to that issue 
was the extent of Defendants' trespasses, if any. The trial court noted that this Court specifically 
called out negligent infliction of emotional distress, if any, was an issue for remand. 
The trial court relied upon Mountainview Landowners Co-op Ass 'n v. Cool 
(Mountainview 11), 142 Idaho 861, 136 P.3d 332 (2006) and State v. Hosey, 134 Idaho 883, 11 
P .3d 1101 (2000) as controlling authority on the issue of whether an item is subsidiary to a 
remand when not specifically addressed in the remand. The trial court concluded that whether 
the issue raised in M.E. Mortensen's motion was a subsidiary issue on remand was not very 
clear. The court indicated it could see reasons why M.E. Mortensen's liability could, and could 
not, be a subsidiary issue on remand. 
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At that point, the trial court struck the motion for summary judgment because it had not 
yet determined the location of the easement on remand, and until such was addressed, it would 
not be addressing the issue of punitive damages on remand. The trial court noted that after the 
trial court's decision on the location of the easement and after determination of punitive 
damages, M.E. Mortensen could renew her motion for summary judgment or make some other 
dispositive motion to Court on whether she should not be held liable for punitive damages 
because "[i]t is only fair to allow Marti Mortensen be heard on this legal argument, albeit at a 
later time." R Vol. II, p. 231. The trial court noted it was taking the action it did because it 
made the best use of the court's resources as there was no decision yet, and waiting allowed M.E. 
Mortensen an opportunity to defend against punitive damages from a factual standpoint and a 
legal standpoint. 
The trial court's order specifically allowed M.E. Mortensen to raise the legal arguments 
contained in her motion for partial summary judgment at a later time. Following the entry of the 
trial court's decision regarding the location of the Parcel B easement, M.E. Mortensen never 
renewed her motion, nor did she file a similar dispositive motion. 
The trial court's approach to M.E. Mortensen's motion was entirely appropriate and 
practical. Her motion was premature because the trial court had been directed on remand to 
determine the location of the easement and then address damages in light of its decision on 
location of the prescriptive easement on remand. M.E. Mortensen provides no explanation on 
appeal for her failure to abide by the trial court's directive to re-file her motion after the location 
ofthe easement was determined. M.E. Mortensen's failure precludes her from raising this issue 
on appeal. 
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Should this Court determine that M.E. Mortensen did not waive the issue by her failure to 
follow the trial court's directive to raise the issue after the determination of the location of the 
prescriptive easement across Parcel B, then it will have to address M.E. Mortensen's claim that 
this issue is subsidiary to the issues remanded in the second remand, and therefore did not have 
to be raised in the first or second appeal. 
M.E. Mortensen claims that this issue was not waived on appeal because it was a 
subsidiary issue to the matters remanded by this Court in the previous remand. In Mountainview 
Landowners Co-op. Ass'n, Inc. v. Cool, 142 Idaho 861,205 P.3d 1175 (2006) (Mountainview II), 
this Court discussed subsidiary actions a trial court could take on remand. The Mountainview II 
case involved the interpretation of a Use Agreement regarding use of a private beach for 
swimming. The trial court gave a broad interpretation to the swimming easement granted to 
beach users which this Court found overly broad. On remand, the trial court was directed to 
define the swimming easement in a more limited fashion. 
After remand, the beach owner argued that the swimming easement did not include a 
right to use the beach as a trail to reach the swimming area on the beach (an ingress/egress 
easement). The trial court noted that this issue had not been raised until after the first remand 
and was not in the scope of the first remand. 
The beach owner contended the trial court committed error by not addressing this issue 
following remand. The beach owner contended that although the issue was not raised in the first 
appeal with specificity, the matter of whether Association members could traverse the beach 
came within the broader issue of the scope of the easement, which, in turn, depended on the 
definition of "swimming" that was the subject of remand. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed 
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the trial court's decision and rejected this argument. In addressing this issue, this Court 
observed: 
"Issues not raised below but raised for the first time on appeal will not be 
considered or reviewed." Whitted v. Canyon County Ed ojComm'rs, 137 Idaho 
118, 122,44 P.3d 1173, 1177 (2002). However, "[t]he general rule is that, on 
remand, a trial court has authority to take actions it is specifically directed to take, 
or those which are subsidiary to the actions directed by the appellate court." 
State v. Hosey, 134 Idaho 883, 886, 11 P.3d 1101, 1104 (2000). 
Mountainview II, 142 Idaho at 866, 205 P.3d at 337. 
M.E. Mortensen likely recognized that the only method in which she can seek to have 
this matter decided is to claim it is within the scope of the remand because the trial court was not 
specifically directed to take action on this issue. Thus, M.E. Mortensen may only raise this issue 
on remand if it is subsidiary to the actions directed by this Court to be taken by the trial court on 
the second remand. 
This issue is not subsidiary to the issues of the location of the prescriptive easement in 
Parcel B. Further, even though it touches on the issue of punitive damages, it is unrelated to 
whether these damages should be reinstated following determination of the location of the 
prescriptive easement. It is not subsidiary to the question whether the revised location ofthe 
prescriptive easement on Parcel B changes the analysis of the amount of trespass damages to 
which Plaintiff may be entitled, or whether there was a breach of duty supporting intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. Therefore, it is not subsidiary and should not be considered on 
remand. 
4. The Community is Liable for V.J. Mortensen's Punitive Damages 
M.E. Mortensen requests on appeal that this Court for the first time reach the issue 
whether the community is liable for all tort obligations, even those which might be characterized 
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as separate. Given the nature of the facts of this case, this Court need not reach that issue in 
determining that the community is liable for all tort obligations. 
This Court has held that debts incurred by one spouse's commission of an intentional tort 
can be satisfied out of community assets, even if the other spouse has no personal liability when 
intended for the protection of community property and in the interest of the community business. 
See Hansen v. Blevins, 84 Idaho 49,367 P.2d 758 (1962). However, Hansen left open the issue 
whether community property is liable in all cases for the payment of obligations incurred by the 
tortuous actions of the other spouse. 
M.E. Mortensen advances two arguments why this ruling should not apply in this case. 
The first is that she is now divorced from V.J. Mortensen. This argument has little weight to the 
legal analysis utilized by this Court in arriving at the Hansen v. Blevins holding. The issue is the 
marital status at the time the act occurred. At the time of the trespasses, the Mortensens were 
married. 
The next argument presented by M.E. Mortensen is that punitive damages are awarded 
for willful and malicious conduct, and therefore such damages were not for the community 
benefit. M.E. Mortensen also contends she did not participate in or know about the trespass 
actions ofV.J. Mortensen. Turning to the knowledge argument, it is difficult to believe that 
M.E. Mortensen was unaware of the present suit and the facts surrounding it, considering that 
she and V.J. Mortensen filed a pro se counterclaim, and M.E. Mortensen was the one to mail it to 
Akers. However, this factor holds no weight to the analysis of the community's obligation for 
the punitive damages. Further, there is no testimony in the record to support M.E. Mortensen's 
contention on appeal that she had no knowledge of what acts her husband was doing on the 
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Akers property, or ofV.J. Mortensen's general business tactics used to develop their community 
property. 
Similar to the case of Hegg v. Internal Revenue Serv., 136 Idaho 61, 28 P.3d 1004 (2001), 
M.E. Mortensen wishes to argue she is an im10cent (and newly divorced) spouse, and therefore 
any portion of community property which she obtained in the divorce should not be available for 
satisfaction of the punitive damages. However, as was discussed in Hegg v. Internal Revenue 
Serv., a determination of innocence of the spouse in the acts is not the deciding factor. The court 
therein indicated the deciding factor was whether the community benefited or participated in the 
trespass. Id. at 63, 28 P.3d at 1006. 
There is no dispute that at the time of the trespasses, V.J. Mortensen was managing a 
community asset being the acreage owned by both V.J. and M.E. Mortensen. Tr Vol. I, p. 205, 
11. 4-25. V.J. Mortensen intended his acts to be for the protection of community property and in 
the interest of the community business. Thus, this case falls squarely within the holding of 
Hansen v. Blevins, 84 Idaho 49, 367 P.2d 758 (1962). 
M.E. Mortensen argues that the holding of Hansen supports her position. It does not. In 
Hanson v. Blevins, supra, this Court noted that the deciding factor in holding the community 
responsible for the husband's torts was whether his acts were intended for the protection of the 
community property and in the interest of the community business. Id at 57,367 P.2d at 762. 
M.E. Mortensen urges the court to adopt an exception to this rule in the present case 
because the tort that was committed was done willfully and with malice. M.E. Mortensen 
contends that once a spouse engages in willful malicious conduct, the spouse is no longer 
seeking to benefit the community. That argument does not necessarily follow. In this case, the 
trial court specifically found that V.J. Mortensen has engaged in inappropriate conduct in 
21 
developing other properties with the intent of achieving a profit. The trial court found that V.J. 
Mortensen's behavior in the present case was motivated by the same desire. M.E. Mortensen 
does not challenge those findings on appeal. Thus, the trial court found that the entire purpose 
behind V.J. Mortensen's actions was to profit the community. Therefore, under the facts and 
circumstances of this case, this Court should hold that the community is liable for the punitive 
damages arising from V.J. Mortensen's torts. 
D. The Trial Court's Award of Attorney Fees should be Affirmed on Appeal 
On remand, Akers timely filed its Memorandum of Costs. M.E. Mortensen did not file 
an objection to costs as required by I.R.C.P. 54(d)(6). Thus, any objections she had are waived 
under the rule. 
Further, her objections are without merit. In reviewing a trial court's decision regarding 
attorneys' fees, an abuse of discretion standard is followed. In determining whether a trial court 
properly exercised its discretion in an award of attorney fees, the Idaho Supreme Court considers 
(1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial 
court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards 
applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its 
decision by an exercise of reason. Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 
87,94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991). 
M.E. Mortensen provides no cite to the record in support of the error she claims. The 
trial court's decision was thorough and addressed the objections raised by White. R Vol. III, pp. 
682-701. M.E. Mortensen contends that Akers failed to allocate fees, and that the record does 
not reflect an apportionment of fees. However, M.E. Mortensen must show on appeal that the 
trial court committed error in its decision awarding fees and costs to Akers. M.E. Mortensen 
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does not get to raise on appeal an issue that was not raised and argued to the trial court on the 
second remand. Thus, this issue was not preserved for appeal. 
Further, even if it had been raised, this court has recognized that the question of whether 
and to what degree the Defendants' conduct constituted trespass on the Akers' property was 
intertwined with the question of the scope and boundaries ofthe defendants' easement, and 
similarly, the question of damages flowing from the defendants' conduct was inseparable from 
consideration of the defendants' easement rights. Akers II at 304, 127 P.3d 207. Thus, the trial 
court did not err in awarding the entirety offees on these issues even though they may have 
overlapped. 
E. The Trial Court did not Err in Failing to Recuse Itself 
M.E. Mortensen echoes the argument of other appellants that Judge Mitchell should have 
recused himself on remand. She provides no argument or legal authority for this position.] 
Absent some argument, there is no merit to this argument on appeal. Jorgensen v. Coppedge, 
145 Idaho 524, 181 P.3d 450 (2008). 
V. CONCLUSION 
V.J. Mortensen's appeal should be denied and the trial court's decision on the second 
remand should be affirmed. 
Submitted this 31 st day of July, 2012. 
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A. 
"'-Susan P. Weeks, ISB #4255 
Attorneys for Respondents 
I Akers acknowledges that the Supreme Court's Opinion in Capstar v. Lawrence, 2012 Opinion No. 80, released 
May 29,2012, might be argued to stand for this proposition. 
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